### NATO Good – TNWs Good – Top Level

#### Removing TNWs destroys alliance commitments and leads to WMD prolif.

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Possible consequences of a rupture with established arrangements

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe.

Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO's nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

The United States has been engaged in nuclear force cooperation with its allies in Europe since the 1950s, and this half-century of history has a certain political weight. If the United States unilaterally withdrew its remaining nuclear forces, the European allies would recognize that something fundamental had changed in their relationship with Washington. If the withdrawal was undertaken at the behest of the Europeans, US political leaders could for their part come to question the commitment of the European allies to bear their share of the risks and responsibilities associated with the alliance's nuclear deterrence posture. Withdrawal of the remaining US weapons could lead to an erosion of confidence on both sides. Some allied observers are concerned that depending on offshore and distant US central strategic systems to protect the European allies would not have the same political significance as continued allied involvement in risk- and responsibility-sharing.

NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements help to maintain a common security culture within the alliance and to prevent a division between the allies that possess nuclear arms and those that do not. The involvement of non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear-sharing arrangements creates a quality of engagement and solidarity distinct from that which would be feasible without that involvement. The political dynamics of the alliance might well change without US nuclear weapons in Europe—and not for the better, in the view of some allied observers. Over time the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies would almost certainly have less expertise regarding nuclear issues and less influence over (and less insight into) US policy-making.70 Some allied observers fear that with no US nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States might be less likely to engage in consultations with allies in defining doctrine and in making operational decisions.

In short, some allied observers are concerned that giving up the shared nuclear response capability could weaken the bonds that tie the NATO allies together as a security community. Because the US extended deterrent provides NATO with a capability that is jointly owned and operated, there is a high level of cohesion based on shared risks and responsibilities, particularly among the NATO DCA states. Moreover, some allied observers maintain, some current non-nuclear weapon-state NATO allies cannot be protected from aggression or coercion without nuclear deterrence capabilities. If the allies gave up the current nuclear sharing arrangements and relied solely on the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the alliance's nuclear deterrent posture could be seen as less credible by the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies, if not by potential adversaries. A security gap dividing the nuclear-weapon-state allies from non-nuclear-weapon-state allies could emerge in the perceptions of the latter group of countries. Indeed, if the British and French forces were reduced further, the political gap between the United States and most of its NATO allies in nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing could be widened.

Moreover, the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe could be seen as a break with the historic transatlantic bargain whereby the United States plays a leading role in return for providing a security guarantee. It could contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment to the collective defence pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a time when the meaning of collective defence is being reconsidered, owing in part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyberwarfare. Some European allied observers hold that the complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would be interpreted, at least in some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso facto weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent. The implications for assurance of the NATO European allies could therefore be profound.

The consequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe would include the loss of the crisis management options provided by an alliance deterrent posture involving aircraft from multiple allies. This arrangement makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signal—one of a united and resolute alliance—distinct from a US (or British or French) national action. It is difficult to imagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent benefits for alliance cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but the examination of other approaches may well be an issue in the alliance's Strategic Concept review. In this review assurance and extended deterrence will be considered in a dynamic context involving other NATO policy challenges—including missile defence, relations with Russia, the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms control and disarmament, and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made remain to be seen.

### NATO Good – Russia Deterrence

#### TNWs prevent a Russian nuclear first strike and aggression in the Baltics.

Bowman and Gabel 19 (Bradley Bowman, senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Andrew Gabel, research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 6-14-2019, "The US must deploy a sub-launched low-yield nuke," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/06/14/the-us-must-deploy-a-sub-launched-low-yield-nuke/>, AK)

To address an important gap in America’s nuclear deterrent, the U.S. should deploy without delay a submarine-launched low-yield nuclear ballistic missile.

In its fiscal 2020 budget request, the Trump administration requested funding to deploy a low-yield SLBM in order to deter Russia’s potential employment of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in February 2019 that this capability was “necessary to our strategic deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.”

Sometimes characterized as “escalate to de-escalate,” Moscow has developed a war-fighting strategy and doctrine that emphasize the first use (or threat of use) of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes against conventional military targets. Such an approach would aim to coerce the U.S. and its NATO partners into backing down and accepting Moscow’s new gains achieved through aggression. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review assessed that this Russian nuclear strategy increases the chances of “dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”

The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission specifically addressed a scenario in which Moscow used false reports of atrocities against Russian populations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to justify an invasion of these NATO member countries under the guise of a “peacekeeping” mission. In this scenario envisioned by the commission, “As U.S. and NATO forces prepare to respond, Russia declares that strikes against Russian forces in those states will be treated as attacks on Russia itself — implying a potential nuclear response.”

Would Moscow actually use a low-yield nuclear weapon against NATO conventional forces responding to Russian aggression in the Baltics? Facts and prudence do not permit ruling that out. NATO leaders would be forced to decide whether Moscow was engaging in a nuclear bluff. If the fear of Russia’s potential use of a low-yield nuclear weapon prevented a NATO response, Russian President Vladimir Putin would achieve his leading grand strategic goal — the effective end of NATO as a collective-defense alliance.

Yet, if NATO did honor Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and responded by sending conventional forces to push Russian forces out of NATO territory, Moscow might be tempted to employ low-yield nuclear weapons if it thought it could get away with it. It seems certain that some Russian military planners would assess that the U.S. would not risk global nuclear war by responding to Moscow’s tactical nuclear strike with a high-yield nuclear weapon, thereby increasing the chances Moscow might employ a low-yield attack in the first place.

Such a scenario may seem far-fetched and too horrible to contemplate for many Americans, but a review of Russian nuclear strategy and doctrine makes clear that the Kremlin views nuclear weapons differently. As the Nuclear Posture Review confirms, “Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use.”

In short, assuming Moscow would not employ low-yield nuclear weapons in this manner — and making defense policy decisions based on that assumption — would be both dangerous and unwarranted.

Critics argue that the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons on submarines would spark or exacerbate a nuclear arms race. Moscow has already taken tangible steps toward an arms race: The Kremlin began a comprehensive and aggressive modernization of its nuclear arsenal years ago. Today, Russia already possesses a stockpile of up to 2,000 active nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

The question is whether the U.S. will respond appropriately to protect Americans — or unilaterally constrain its response and ignore Russia’s nuclear activities.

Others claim that a low-yield SLBM is unnecessary because the U.S. already has air-deliverable low-yield nuclear capabilities. That argument ignores increasingly advanced Russian air and missile defense capabilities, as well as the distinct challenges a U.S. low-yield SLBM would present to Russian military planners.

Critics also suggest the deployment of a low-yield nuclear weapon on submarines would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. In reality, fielding a low-yield SLBM would allow the U.S. to more reliably respond at the same nuclear escalatory level. Without low-yield SLBMs, the U.S. could be forced to rely on vulnerable low-yield delivery systems, not respond with nuclear weapons at all or use a larger nuclear warhead.

Based on a perceived reluctance of the U.S. to risk global nuclear war, this could lead Moscow to believe that its use of tactical nuclear weapons might not elicit an effective nuclear response by Washington. That belief — and not the deployment of a U.S. low-yield SLBM — represents the greatest risk for increasing the likelihood of nuclear war.

#### TNWs are key to deter Russian authoritarianism.

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Continuing assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe

The assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe appear to include the following: to serve as a hedge against Russian recidivism; to deter regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); to provide an alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces; to offer an alternative to the pursuit of national nuclear forces; and to supply evidence of the genuineness of US commitments. Each of these roles deserves a brief discussion.

Hedge against Russian recidivism

The alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept dropped the 'strategic balance' language concerning NATO-Russia relations found in the 1991 Strategic Concept. It nonetheless included subtle references to the alliance's continuing responsibility to hedge against the risk of backsliding in Moscow, given Russia's long-term power potential, particularly its nuclear forces:

Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists... The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.12

In July 2002 Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, offered a rare public acknowledgement that one of the factors defining the US nuclear posture must be the continuing need for a hedge against potential adverse developments in Russia. In Powell's words, 'there are nuclear-armed nations out there, particularly Russia, [and] even though it is a new relationship, a new partnership—they will have nuclear weapons for many, many years to come, and one cannot predict the future with certainty. So therefore it is wise for us, in view of that ... to give us a hedge.'13 It is noteworthy that US President Barack Obama included a reaffirmation of US extended deterrence commitments in his speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague in April 2009: 'As long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies—including the Czech Republic.'14

The role of the alliance's nuclear posture as a 'hedge against Russian backsliding' is generally not explicitly articulated in public statements by NATO or its member nations in part because of the interest in promoting cooperation with Russia in various areas, including the campaigns against terrorism and WMD proliferation. However, this rationale remains pertinent and meaningful to allies, despite differences in threat assessments. Allies in Eastern and Central Europe are especially concerned about trends in Russia towards more authoritarian and assertive rule. Russian officials have declared that certain new allies have made themselves potential targets for nuclear attack by supporting US missile defence plans.15 The NATO allies have agreed that Moscow's use of force against Georgia in August 2008 was 'disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration'.16 Officials of various allied nations have expressed concerns, though they have been cautious in their public remarks. For example, in December 2008 the President of Estonia affirmed the need for NATO's deterrent posture in the light of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict without explicitly mentioning that conflict:

The fact that NATO is serious about its security has proved to be a powerful deterrent. Indeed, only an actor as irrational as AI Qaeda has dared to gamble with an attack against the world's strongest conventional, nuclear, economic, and political organization ... As this summer showed us, the reasons for NATO have not disappeared, but have in fact returned, if not with a vengeance, then certainly with a strong taste of revanche.17

### NATO Good – TNWS – Deterrence

#### TNWs are key to deterrence---they link US nukes together.

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The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world's first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America's will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap' controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO—and for Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. The recent Perry—Schlesinger report suggests that such a debate may be on the horizon.3 A polarizing internal US debate (perhaps stimulated by the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review) could lead to public questions about the reliability of US nuclear forces, and this could undermine allied confidence in US extended deterrence. By contrast, US consensus on investment in sustaining and modernizing the nation's nuclear weapons and infrastructure could support allied perceptions of the continued reliability of the US nuclear posture. Indeed, the continued viability of what some Americans call the US nuclear 'enterprise' may be more reassuring to US allies than the overall size and specific characteristics of the nuclear force. For US allies in Europe and elsewhere, short of a grave crisis that would test the resolve and operational capabilities of the United States, the overall health of the US nuclear enterprise and the US nuclear force posture remains significant for extended deterrence.

### NATO Good – TNWs Good - WMD Prolif

#### American TNWs are key to prevent WMD proliferation.

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Deterrence of WMD proliferants

According to the April 1999 Strategic Concept,

The Alliance's forces ... contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC [nuclear, chemical, and biological] weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.18

If it is reasonable to presume that the alliance's forces include its nuclear forces, the deterrence of WMD proliferants constitutes a second assurance function of US nuclear forces in Europe. Statements to this effect have been made by officials of allied governments since the early 1990s. For example, in 1992 the German Defence Minister, Volker Rühe, declared that 'These [nuclear] weapons insure us politically against risks that we cannot calculate, risks which might arise from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.'19

Various potential WMD proliferation developments could strengthen the case for upholding US extended deterrence commitments in NATO and beyond. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran might influence decisions in nearby countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, regarding potential national nuclear weapons development or acquisition programmes. Maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence protection might be critical to assuring the beneficiaries of US security guarantees that they may safely forego pursuing their own national nuclear capabilities. A related policy challenge of pivotal importance is determining how the United States and its NATO allies might deter Iranian efforts to employ nuclear weapons.20

#### Credible US TNWs deter Turkish and German nuclear prolif---saves the NPT.

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Alternative to the pursuit of national nuclear forces

The non-proliferation function of NATO's nuclear posture concerns not only the alliance's potential adversaries but also the members of the alliance that are non-nuclear-weapon states. The United States discovered in the mid-1960s that it was imperative to reach agreements with its NATO allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, on nuclear sharing and consultation arrangements—including Germany's permanent membership in the NATO NPG founded in 1966-7—in order to be able to conclude the NPT.28 The NATO arrangements, including US nuclear forces in Europe, have served to assure Germany and other non-nuclear-weapon-state allies that they have no need to seek nuclear weapons of their own.

These allies have, moreover, adhered to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, nonetheless pointed out in 1995 that 'The Turkish commitment to non-nuclear weapons status is coupled with several strong qualifiers.' The caveats associated with US nuclear commitments are perhaps the most significant:

the strategic balance between the United States and NATO and the Russian Federation must not be allowed to erode, by the former's unilateral moves to the disadvantage of NATO, until Russia gives sustained evidence that it has devalued the role of nuclear weapons in its overall foreign policy, including its policy toward the near abroad and their neighbors rather than merely in its Western policy ... In other words, the extended deterrence of the United States must remain convincing and credible to Turks as well as to de facto and de jure nuclear weapons states and potential proliferators.29

It is noteworthy in this regard that in 2007 US congressional staff sought the views of Turkish political leaders regarding how US extended deterrence commitments might affect their country's reaction to Tehran's possible acquisition of nuclear arms:

In a closed door meeting, staff asked a group of influential Turkish politicians how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. These politicians emphatically responded that Turkey would pursue nuclear weapons as well. These individuals stated, 'Turkey would lose its importance in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons a Turkey does not.' Another politician said it would be 'compulsory' for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario. However, when staff subsequently asked whether a U.S. nuclear umbrella and robust security commitment would be sufficient to dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all three individuals agreed that it would. 30

### NATO Good – TNWs Good – Allied Confidence

#### TNW pullout unravels cohesion.

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Consequences

What these elements suggest is that a new strategic fracture could open up on the continent. A future US-German convergence for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance’s strategy, which would be supported by several NATO and EU members, would be problematic for Paris and London. Also, a unilateral decision by one nuclear-sharing country to cease its participation in the process and demand the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons could lead to an unraveling of the whole scheme through the empowerment of anti-nuclear forces in national parliaments of other countries. That would put an end to a decades-old arrangement, often seen to be at the core of the transatlantic bargain, the “sharing of nuclear risks and responsibilities”.

The materialization of such scenarios would not be without consequences on the political cohesion of Western institutions (NATO and the EU), and would put at risk the very notion of a common European strategic culture. Not only would non-nuclear NATO countries be cut off from the discussions about nuclear planning and operations, but they would also lose the opportunity to weigh on Alliance nuclear policy. Perhaps most importantly, this would also affect the perception by potential adversaries of the solidity of these discussions and on deterrence itself, at a time when Russia increasingly appears as a major strategic threat.

#### Only TNWs send a strong deterrence signal and boost cohesion.

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In other words, the traditional arguments for keeping US nuclear forces in Europe remain valid in the judgement of many officials and experts in the alliance. These arguments can be summed up as follows: US nuclear forces based in Europe send a more potent deterrent message about US commitments than reliance solely on US nuclear weapons at sea and in North America. With the US nuclear presence, extensive nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing, and consultative arrangements for multinational nuclear policy deliberations and implementation, the alliance has greater confidence in its strength and cohesion than it would have without these interrelated attributes—and greater confidence that adversaries will recognize NATO's resolve and capabilities.

#### Weapons sharing is key to cohesion. Experts prevent accidents.

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Participating directly in NATO's nuclear posture provides select NATO allies with a cadre of nuclear experts and key officials with experience in thinking about nuclear deterrence and the requirements of nuclear crisis management operations. The national representatives in the NPG Staff Group at NATO headquarters in Brussels and the experts in nuclear policy issues in the defence ministries of NATO governments are often active-duty or retired military officers with experience in nuclear planning and operations. The allied roles in NATO's nuclear posture reflect a high degree of mutual trust and confidence. These roles promote alliance cohesion, add to assurance about the genuineness of US commitments, and make consultations more informed and meaningful.

### NATO Good AT: French Nuclear Umbrella

#### French nuclear umbrella fails---it’s underdeveloped, and allies say no.

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Alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces

The hypothetical alternative of relying on French nuclear forces instead of US protection has been evoked repeatedly since France became a nuclear power in the 1960s; but the option has never been taken up by the non-nuclear-weapon state allies. For example, in 1985 Manfred Wörner, then the West German Defence Minister, said, 'France's nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal Republic [of Germany]. We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella.'21

Some Germans have argued that the French should participate in NATO nuclear consultations rather than establishing a consultation arrangement (as the French have intermittently proposed since 1992) limited to Europeans, excluding the United States and implying that US nuclear commitments are unreliable. As Karl Heinz Kamp observed in 1996, 'From a German viewpoint any European nuclear entity can only be one part of a European-transatlantic security structure.'22 In 2004 Peter Schmidt wrote, 'For Germany, a European solution could only be sound in the near future if it was associated with the [NATO] Alliance's nuclear policy.'23 In 2007 it was reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had rejected French President Nicolas Sarkozy's offer to give Germany a say in French decision-making on nuclear weapons.24

Expert observers from non-nuclear-weapon-state European allied nations have historically expressed several reservations regarding French proposals for a European Union dialogue on nuclear deterrence. First, the EU member states have not yet made alliance-like collective defence commitments to each other. Second, two EU members that are not NATO members (Ireland and Sweden) are among the countries that have long called in international forums for 'the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines'. In their view, 'the possession of nuclear weapons' should give way to 'nuclear disarmament and ... a nuclear weapon-free world.'25 As a result, the willingness of Ireland and Sweden to be associated with an EU arrangement implying support for policies of nuclear deterrence is unclear. Third, some allies regard French (and British) nuclear capabilities as inadequate to provide a deterrent force to protect the EU and (aside from French and British national purposes) useful mainly as a supplement to the US extended deterrence arrangements with NATO members.2 Fourth, making France the guarantor of the European Union's security would elevate France's political status to a level unacceptable to Germany, Italy, and other EU countries. Fifth, despite their repeated proposals, the French have in practice shown little willingness to accept nuclear consultation obligations and mechanisms. For example, concrete implementation arrangements for President François Mitterrand's 1986 promise to consult with the West German Chancellor before using nuclear weapons on German soil evidently never went very far.27

Rather than welcoming an opportunity to grapple with the demanding political and strategic issues that would be raised in an attempt to pursue the hypothetical alternative of depending on French or Franco-British nuclear protection, the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies have preferred to rely on US extended deterrence arrangements in NATO, supplemented by the British nuclear commitment to NATO.

### NATO Good – Russia

#### NATO uncertainty causes Russia to capitalize on their weakness – the aff solves by unifying NATO

DeBski 22 SłAwomir DęBski, Opinion Contributor, 7-8-2022, "The wrong NATO signals to Russia could mean more war for Europe," Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3549231-the-wrong-nato-signals-to-russia-could-mean-more-war-for-europe/

Since the USSR’s collapse, the Russian Federation’s strategic goal has been to maintain a buffer zone over its western neighborhood that includes NATO territory. A weakened Russia was unable to stop the sovereign aspirations of former Soviet republics in the Baltics, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. But it demanded that the free world recognize their independence merely as a tentative fact. Newly revealed German archival documents reportedly show that then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl exploited Russia’s weakness to unite Germany and opposed recognizing Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian independence, while vetoing their membership in NATO and the European Union. His successor, Gerhard Schröder, pushed for energy cooperation with Russia and, after suffering electoral defeat, became a lobbyist for the Russian gas giant Gazprom. Then, former Chancellor Angela Merkel blocked Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO in 2008. Former French President Francois Mitterand and his successors also fell prey to Russian arguments against their membership. So, Moscow got the memo that Europe’s whole, free and at peace moment is temporary and up for revision. The Obama administration’s unconvincing response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 only emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin in his belief that the free world will comply with his subjecting former Soviet republics. Russia also saw President Biden’s policy of halting two decades of continuous wars fought by the United States, beginning with the immediate evacuation of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, as a window of opportunity to change the rules of the game — a “green light” to relaunch a war of aggression against Ukraine with a goal of exterminating it as a nation. Russia was unable to stand in the way of former Central European satellites joining NATO, but demanded that their membership status have a feeble character. Unfortunately, NATO agreed to this in 1997. Assuming Russia’s good will, the alliance created a political declaration — the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In essence, Russia received a political commitment from the alliance that it would not deploy substantial combat forces to new member states. Moscow perceived this as a victory, believing that provisional membership status for NATO’s newest members could be reversed one day, either diplomatically or by force. As long as Russia pursued peaceful politics, the Founding Act didn’t seem to be a big concession. But Russia has shielded its weakness by creating holes and hidden “gray zones” in Europe’s security system to exploit and undermine it whenever geopolitically possible. Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea violated all provisions of international law; war again became a political tool in Europe. That was when the Founding Act should have been thrown into the dustbin of history, since it was unceremoniously broken by Russia. Instead, some NATO members — led by Germany and France — did everything possible to prevent the act from landing in the rubbish heap. During the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, buttressing the Eastern Flank was calibrated so as not to undermine the Founding Act by opposing the stationing of substantial combat forces in new member states threatened by Russian aggression. Russia received another signal that some NATO members evidently recognize its claims to a sphere of influence, provoking it to act aggressively. In December 2021, Putin issued an ultimatum to NATO and the U.S., demanding they give up their “open door” policy, withdraw forces from the Eastern Flank, and agree to legally binding limitations on military activity in the region. When the demands weren’t met, Russia attacked Ukraine. It should be clear that Russia exploits indecisiveness and wrong messaging, driven by political wishful thinking, for its aggressive, imperialist purposes. At its recent summit in Madrid, NATO formally invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Members adopted a new strategic concept, labeling Russia a “clear and present danger.” They agreed to station more NATO and U.S. troops on the Eastern Flank, and will have larger reinforcements than before. From the military point of view, such decisions should strengthen defense and deterrence. But even now — after Russia’ss bombing of Kyiv and Kharkiv, and in light of atrocities committed by Russian troops in Bucha, Irpin and Mariupol — the Founding Act, which Russia has violated since February 2014, wasn’t denounced. Did some European allies object? Instead, a compromise formula was adopted — “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” But that’s not enough, as long as there is room for Russia to interpret that respecting the Founding Act means allowing second-class status for NATO’s Eastern Flank allies. Remember, Russia understands indecisiveness and a lack of will to act as weakness and an invitation for aggression.

#### Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is irrational and fueled by violent nationalistic desires, not NATO

Majumdar 22 Bhaskar Majumdar, 6-27-2022, "Russian Imperialism, Not NATO Expansion, Caused the Ukraine War," Fair Observer, https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-imperialism-not-nato-expansion-caused-the-ukraine-war/

When it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is easy to get into the popular narrative of the Cold War. Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this narrative still lives subconsciously, if not consciously, in people’s minds. It puts things in easy perspectives: a binary black and white, the US against Russia, us versus them. To quote George W. Bush (Bush Junior), this narrative is simple: “If you are not with us, you are against us.” While the Cold War mindset might be obvious, other modes of thinking are less so. A key one is imperialism. In my naive youth, I had never believed that Americans would think of their role in the world from a great-power imperialistic perspective. When the Iraq War broke out in 2003, my impression was rudely shattered. I met a doctor in Connecticut and told him that I had just come from Kuwait. The good medic had never been outside his native state of Connecticut. Yet he expansively waved his hands and asked me: “So how are we managing the region?” I realized then that this attitude was as imperial as the British one of “managing” India or the French one of “managing” Algeria or that of any colonial power “managing” a colony. Our good doctor was well aware that the US Army had a base in Kuwait and the gateway to Iraq was directly through Kuwait. He assumed that the US was responsible for the whole region as some form of a world’s policeman and sovereign states in the region had little say in the matter. Given the fact that the US is the top dog as the sole superpower, it is easy to blame it for neo imperialism and more. Yet imperialism is not an American monopoly and it is important not to view the world through a monochromatic lens. US Provocation or Russian Imperialism? Some of the popular narrative in many countries is that the US is responsible for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, at least in part. John Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago, has popularized this line of thought. He **argues that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russian** President Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine. **The problem with this argument is that it is curiously imperial.** As per Mearsheimer’s worldview, NATO in general and the US in particular were at fault for welcoming countries that were in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Admitting the three former Soviet republics in the Baltics was rubbing salt into wounded Russian pride. This view forgets that the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, expanded in western Europe as well as in the east all the way to the Pacific. In 1979, the Soviet troops even marched into Afghanistan to protect the communist government. None of the countries that suffered under Moscow’s yoke wants to go back to those. That is what so many of them lined up to join NATO when the Soviet Union fell. Eastern European nations also turned to the EU because of economic opportunities on offer. Poles, Lithuanians and even Hungarians prefer to work in France, Germany and the UK instead of in Russia. In a nutshell, NATO guaranteed security against an imperial Moscow while the EU boosted the economy for Eastern Europe. An imperial view would see the expansion of NATO as a win for the US and a loss to Russia. However, it might be a good idea not to think of NATO or even the EU expanding east but Eastern Europe moving westward. “Go West, young man” had a new meaning for Poles suffering from nightmares of the 1943 Katyn Forest Massacre when the Soviets slaughtered the flower of Polish society. Obviously, Russia did not like the eastward expansion of NATO or the EU. For a historically imperial power, this was deeply humiliating. In particular, the Soviet collapse scarred Vladimir Putin. This former KGB officer ended up driving a taxi for a bit. As Atul Singh and Glenn Carle write, the 1990s deeply traumatized Russians “who interpret almost every US action and statement as pieces of a long term, coherent plan to undermine Russia.” Russia claims that NATO threatens its sovereignty by encroaching on its near abroad. What Is the Conflict Really About? **The reality is that NATO armies have no designs on Russian territory. It is Russia that annexed Crimea with impunity and in contravention of international law. Now, it has attacked Ukraine without provocation.** It is razing entire cities, killing civilians and committing atrocities in a classically brutal Russian way. The history and the current reality of Russia puts fear into the hearts of its neighbors. That is why Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO. Their action is defensive, not offensive. US President Joe **Biden may have been at fault in Afghanistan but he is not at fault for Ukraine.** Putin is the man responsible for this conflict. Running a kleptocratic regime, this authoritarian leader needs to squash a democratic Ukraine. This removes the risk of calls for democracy in Russia. If Russian forces had taken Kyiv, a Moscow-friendly government would be in place. That was a key objective for Putin’s reckless assault on Kyiv. Unfortunately for the new tsar of Russia, Ukrainians beat back Russian forces. Now Russian troops are taking over the Donbas region and much of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast so that Russia has a land route to Crimea. Putin’s constant references to history are self-serving justifications and too clever by half obfuscations. Putin recently compared himself to Peter the Great who fought the Great Northern Wars from 1700 to 1721. Addressing young scientists and entrepreneurs, Putin “talked politics and power.” He spoke about the new battle for geopolitical dominance and proclaimed Peter the Great to be a role model who in Putin’s eyes reclaimed Russian land. For Putin, it is all about land. Russia wants the Donbas, period. And maybe some more.

#### Offensive realism is wrong and can’t explain Russia’s actions in Ukraine – 3 warrants

Davenport 22 John J. Davenport (John J. Davenport teaches political philosophy, including just war theory, human rights, global governance, democratic theory, and related topics at Fordham University in New York City), 7-5-2022, "Shared blame for Russia's war on Ukraine is not realism — it's irrational," National Catholic Reporter, https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/shared-blame-russias-war-ukraine-not-realism-its-irrational

But the controversy surrounding Francis' remark derives from its resonance with the political scientist John Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory that "great powers" will generally do whatever is necessary to dominate their region of the globe as a means to their own national security — whatever they pretend to believe about the human rights of civilians and codes of international law, which have banned annexation of territory by force for over a century. In his infamous New Yorker interview, and in a lecture widely circulated online, Mearsheimer blamed NATO nations for provoking Putin's war on Ukraine by ignoring Putin's view that for Ukraine to become "pro-America liberal democracy" would be an "existential threat" to Russia. Despite its shocking incompatibility with the "rules-based international order" established by 150 years of treaties rooted in just war theory and natural law, Mearsheimer's view is popular because it claims to be brutally honest about "harder, darker constraints of an anarchic world," which follow from a few postulates about sovereign states and their leaders' motives. **But in fact, the spell it casts on thinking about foreign policy is deeply misleading** for three main reasons, ranging from more to less obvious. **First, offensive realism is not merely an empirical or predictive device**, as its defenders sometimes like to claim: It tells leading nations like the United States to allow other powerful states a limited "sphere" in which they act as hegemons, but also to "counterbalance" them when, like China today, they threaten interests beyond their own immediate region. This is an imperialist standpoint typical of 19th-century thinking, as Mearsheimer readily admits: It tolerates, and thus encourages, the poisonous notion that a nation's great power permits it to turn otherwise-independent states around it into mere proxies and use their peoples as "buffers" against conceivable foreign attacks. For example, in 2016, Mearsheimer and coauthor Stephen Walt wrote in Foreign Affairs that what "really matters" most for the United States is to preserve "U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere" while weakening other potential hegemons. They recommended leaving Syria to Putin, despite the Russian forces targeting thousands of civilian buildings and hundreds of hospitals during its air campaign in Syria. ADVERTISEMENT This view, which once countenanced American attempts to control regimes in Latin America, has been rejected by popes at least since Populorum Progressio in 1967, and by the U.S. government since the late 1980s. As Adam Tooze explains, offensive realism traces back to the Nazi lawyer Carl Schmitt's belief in "a world order based on dividing the planet into large spatial blocs, each dominated by a major power." The moral idea that legitimate sovereignty depends on protecting human rights, or the common good more broadly understood, which underwrote the U.N.'s "responsibility to protect" doctrine, has no place in this framework. **Second, while Mearsheimer has been lauded for "predicting" the war in Ukraine, he got Putin's motives mostly wrong**. **Putin knows that NATO is a defensive alliance that has no plans or desire whatsoever to invade Russia.** Kremlin experts understood that NATO admitted Eastern European nations only to secure them against any return to the horrors they suffered under the totalitarian fist of the Soviet Union — fears that have now been fully justified. Two decades ago, Putin even wanted Russia itself to join NATO; this tragically wasted opportunity runs contrary to offensive realism theory. Instead, as Robert Person and Michael McFaul argue, what Putin feared was never NATO expansion but rather the spread of democratic values. Kremlin complaints about NATO were correlated with upsurges of democratic reform movements within Russia inspired by the Arab Spring in 2011 and later by Ukrainians ousting Putin's puppet ruler in Kyiv. In sum, Putin sees that the main threat to his kleptocratic dictatorship is not NATO forces within his geographic region, but rather ideals of democratic self-governance and global standards that clamp down on corruption. Add to this, as Ross Douthat notes, following Anne Applebaum, Putin's "very personal desire to restore a mystical vision of a greater Russia." More generally, as Applebaum and Garry Kasparov argue, the dictators in Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, Iran and Nicaragua "understand that the language of democracy, anti-corruption, and justice is dangerous to their form of autocratic power." Offensive realism theory massively understates the influence of such big ideas that move hearts and minds. It would have us believe that governments should focus only on material wealth and physical protection of territory. Political leaders' motives in foreign relations are more complex than this naive deterministic picture implies. For example, Chinese leaders fear uncensored Hollywood movies as much as they fear insecure supply chains for food and raw materials, which they are shoring up through increasing their influence in Africa. Their terror that "Western" ideals — they mean individual autonomy and independent thought — will harm Chinese "interests" has more in common with Taliban religious dogma than with military or economic strategy. This ambiguity about "national interests" explains why offensive realism theory offers no clear criteria to delimit a great power's "natural" sphere within which we should recognize its suzerainty. For example, are small islands near the Philippines in China's putative sphere, despite an international tribunal's ruling against Beijing's claim? Similarly, in 2014, one could have invoked Mearsheimer's own power-balancing rationale to argue for admitting Ukraine into NATO as a way to "contain" Russia's rising power not only in Belarus but also in Syria, Iran, Libya and Mali, which are far from any romanticized ancient Slavic empire. **Third, the strategic axioms on which offensive realism is based only remain plausible while not enough world leaders believe in a rules-based order founded on the common goods of humanity.** Thus, offensive realism helps foster and maintain the very attitudes of distrust and expectations of success through conquest that force peoples who only want peace and prosperity instead to adopt a war footing. In other words, **offensive realism's attraction is like** the proverbial emperor's new clothes: It is a partly **self-fulfilling prophecy** that would predict little in a world where a global alliance of even moderately just republics established trust in minimum thresholds of decency for all governments.

#### The aff doesn’t expand NATO but even if it did there would be no long-term damage to the US/Russia relationship

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**Meaningful cooperation remained possible with NATO enlargemen**t. Indeed, NATO and Russia collaborated extensively in Afghanistan, and the United States attempted to cultivate closer ties with Russia after Barack Obama won the presi-dency in 2008. Contrary to Mearsheimer’s fatalistic predictions about nuclear reduc-tions, the ‘reset’ by the Obama administration even involved both countries signing and ratifying the New START Treaty, an arms control agreement that cut 30% of their strategic nuclear arsenals and capped them at deployed weapons each. Rus-sia did violate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated land-based cruise missiles and launchers of ranges from 500 to 5500 miles, but it has previously complained of the constraints imposed by that treaty for reasons relating to China, not NATO (Gates 2014, 154).Tensions did erupt between the USA and Russia, but the causal impact of NATO enlargement is probably much less than what the conventional wisdom suggests. Some, like Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, argue that domestic political and economic developments drove Russia to be more confrontational toward the United States. Putin justiﬁed political repression at home with reference to the threat alleg-edly posed by the USA (2015, 169, 178).The argument that NATO enlargement has provoked Russian aggression against its neighbors is likely wrong. In one study of Russian leaders’ foreign policy rhetoric from 2000 to 2016, Maria Snegovaya (2020) ﬁnds that Russian leaders articulate anti-Western statements most when oil prices are high, suggesting that—like other petrostates—they are emboldened to press their claims against their neighbors under these circumstances. She uncovers little evidence that NATO enlargement drives anti-Western rhetoric. Another study ﬁnds that Russian diplomats consistently adopt a competitive posture vis-à-vis other envoys in various international organizations (Schmitt 2019). NATO enlargement does appear to have played a role in the lead-up to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, though the alliance rejected giving a Member-ship Action Plan to Georgia partly because of worries about being dragged into a conﬂict with Russia. Territorial disputes and strong personalities made that bilat-eral relationship ripe for conﬂict (Lanoszka 2018). NATO also rejected Ukraine’s application for a Membership Action Plan in 2008. Similarly, NATO played a much lesser role in stoking tensions with Russia than some accounts suggest because it posed at most a very limited threat to Russia. Operationally, national caveats sty-mied NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan while a large majority of its members spent far less than 2% of their gross domestic products on defense (Saideman and Auerswald 2012; Stanley-Lockman and Wolf 2016). The US and NATO military presence east of Germany was (and remains) threadbare, con-sisting mostly of elements making up a missile defense system that even Russian observers like Alexei Arbatov (2016, 168) acknowledge would not undermine strate-gic stability. During much of the Obama administration, the USA was withdrawing military forces from Europe so as to concentrate more fully on East Asia (Simón 2015). Crucially, NATO enlargement was a non-issue when the Maidan movement began in Kyiv in late 2013. At stake was Ukraine’s signature of the Ukraine–Euro-pean Union Association Agreement, which was similar to what long-time Rus-sian protégé Serbia had negotiated earlier that same year. This agreement did not even guarantee that Ukraine would be a European Union member, but would have spurred closer economic and political ties. NATO membership remainder at best a distant prospect.

### NATO Bad – Russia

#### Increasing NATO’s capabilities creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes Russia more likely to lashout

Achar 22 Gilbert Achcar (Gilbert Achcar is a professor at SOAS, University of London. His new book, The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China from Kosovo to Ukraine, will come out in early 2023.) , 6-23-2022, "NATO From Bad to Worse," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/

Supporters of NATO’s eastward expansion wanted the US empire to encompass a large chunk of the former Soviet empire in the belief that, sooner or later, post-communist Russia would seek to revive its long imperial tradition. It was therefore necessary to preempt this inevitable development by securing US control of as much of the former Soviet empire as possible. Since Putin’s regime has indeed engaged in predatory behavior since 2008 in what has traditionally been regarded by Russia as its imperial “near abroad”—intervention in Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas in 2014, attempted invasion for “regime change” in Ukraine in 2022, and ongoing efforts to occupy the whole of Donbas and adjacent areas—one would be tempted to believe that those who advocated NATO’s enlargement have been proven right. The truth is, however, that this outcome is precisely what those who opposed the enlargement had cautioned against. They rightly predicted that the Russians would see NATO’s eastward expansion as a hostile gesture and that it would therefore breed revanchist attitudes among them. In other words, they warned that enlarging NATO in preemption of Russia’s return to imperial behavior would actually act as a **self-fulfilling prophecy**. The 1997 summit officially invited Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance. The three Eastern European countries’ accession was completed two years later at the Washington summit that celebrated NATO’s 50th anniversary. It happened at a time when the alliance was bombing Yugoslavia in contravention of international law, in the first post-1990 US-led war not authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Along with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that circumvented yet again the UNSC, and NATO’s subsequent enlargement in 2004 to seven more East European countries, including the three Baltic states, which were formerly part of the USSR, this sequence of events was decisive in creating the animosity between Russia and the West that was a prelude to the invasion of Ukraine. The forthcoming summit in Madrid will be the occasion of a major qualitative leap in the definition of NATO’s raison d’être, no less consequential than the 1997 summit. This is not an allusion to the formal invitation of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, although this development is certainly very significant, more so perhaps than all previous rounds of enlargement, because it will considerably lengthen NATO’s direct border with Russia (Finland’s border with Russia is 1,340 kilometers long). On this issue, the only question mark is Turkey’s position, since any new membership offer must be unanimously approved by all existing NATO members, a principle that grants each one of them an actual veto right. Ankara wants the two Nordic states to take measures against the Kurdish movement, strongly represented among refugees in both countries. But the most dangerous novelty at the Madrid summit consists of a major qualitative extension of NATO’s purpose. Originally founded as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union and its subordinate states, NATO has mutated after 1991 into a “security organization”—meaning that it has been involved in military actions (NATO as such did not formally engage in any war in the USSR’s days)—and redefined its purpose in ostracizing post-Soviet Russia by expanding toward its borders. The NATO-Russia Council created in 1997 was a meager consolation given to Moscow in lieu of inviting it to join the alliance. Nobody was fooled. From tacit, NATO’s hostility to Russia became explicit after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The forthcoming Madrid summit is going to directly involve NATO in open hostility to China, far beyond the alliance’s original area of relevance. This area is defined in the 1949 treaty constitutive of NATO as comprising “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO’s post-1991 mutation led it to intervene beyond its members’ territory—first in the Balkans, then much further from its original area, in Afghanistan, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Participation in the organization’s meetings has nevertheless remained restricted to Europe and North America. No longer. Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the Madrid summit as NATO “partners” in the Asia-Pacific region—a very **serious provocation to Beijing**. It can only interpret this invitation as a step toward the consolidation of US-led alliances in a single global network opposed to both Russia and China. After the preliminary meeting of NATO’s defense ministers held on June 16, the organization’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, declared that the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted at the Madrid summit will set out the alliance’s position “on Russia, on emerging challenges, and for the first time, on China.” From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June. From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow. These developments bring the world closer to a conflagration that could dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine and endanger the future of humankind. It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.

#### Russia is reactionary – they wouldn’t have invaded Ukraine if NATO had not provoked them

Maguire 22 MAIREAD MAGUIRE (peace activist from Northern Ireland, Nobel Peace Prize recipient), July 7, 2022, "Nato expansion has been main cause of Ukraine military conflict,", Irish News, https://www.irishnews.com/opinion/letterstotheeditor/2022/07/04/news/nato-expansion-has-been-main-cause-of-ukraine-military-conflict-2761003/

Patrick Murphy’s column –‘Pope’s comments may help avert global conflict’ (June 18) – are courageous and challenging. Courageous in that Ireland (and most of Europe) are caught up in Russia-phobia and war propaganda being peddled by our mainstream media and military industrial complex. Mr Murphy quoted Pope Francis as saying that the war was “perhaps somehow either provoked or not prevented”. I think this statement hints towards the elephant in the room (Nato/US endless expansion). The US Peace Council of May 12 describes the Ukraine as a US-manufactured conflict and says “Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine could have been avoided if the US had not relentlessly provoked it”. Nato – the US-dominated global war machine – whose policy is ‘full dominance spectrum’ contrary to its claims it is not a defensive organisation. Its purpose has been to act as an instrument for US world domination and to prevent all challenges to US hegemony. It should have been disbanded in l99l after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but instead expanded into 15 new countries and breaking its promise to President Gorbachev, that it would not expand east. This relentless eastward expansion of Nato during the past decade has been an existential threat to a nuclear-armed Russia and the main cause of the present military conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s military intervention into Ukraine should never have happened and the suffering inflicted upon the Ukrainian people (and Russian) has been horrific and it is right all those who have suffered so much should be helped. However, sending arms into Ukraine only adds fuel to the fire. There are vested interests from western powers hard at work, and much money to be made. As it stands the west is bankrolling the war with arms and billions in dollars/euros, for their own agenda. These people will not shed a tear for the young dead of Ukraine. Their aim is for a weakened Russia (through sanctions), more military spending and a more divided and economically weak Europe, and as long as we continue not to question their role in Ukraine, they will succeed. There seems to be only one winner in this, and they are not in Europe. Now is the time for dialogue and those western political leaders who stoke the fire of fear, division and hate in Ukraine, instead of calling for ceasefire and negotiation, must consider the misery brought upon the poor people that most live with the horrors of war.

#### Expanding NATO through security cooperation does not solve. It only provides the US with more avenues to create conflicts that support their own interests – causes Russian backlash and strengthens the Sino-Russo alliance

Dogan 22 Haluk Dogan (Haluk Dogan is a PhD candidate in Strategy and Security within the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, where he also completed his MA in International Relations. His research focuses on international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and West-Russia relations.) ,22 Feb 2022, "The US provoked the Russian invasion to maintain its global primacy," US provoked the Russian invasion to maintain its global primacy, https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-us-provoked-the-russian-invasion-to-maintain-its-global-primacy-55000

In a moot effort to cling to its hegemony and keep NATO relevant, Washington has, in turn, allowed the invasion to happen. Following a long period of escalation, Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered troops into Eastern Ukraine’s two breakaway regions, prompting immediate Western condemnation and an emergency UN Security Council meeting. While Moscow stands accused by the West of increasing acts of aggression on the Ukrainian border, **the invasion was not a one-sided event.** For months, the Anglo-American bloc has been unwilling to de-escalate the crisis. Washington and London have aimed to resuscitate the case for the NATO alliance, to invalidate arguments for a separate European Union-wide security arrangement, and to weaken Russia in seeking to prevent the emergence of rival blocs in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific regions. However, to put it bluntly, this strategy will not reverse the decline of American hegemony. Is the ‘transatlantic alliance’ back? A couple of days before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his disappointment at the failure of his Western “friends” to support Ukraine vis-a-vis Russian aggression. This perception is consistent with Ukrainian officials’ previous accusation that **US President Joe Biden gave Moscow a “green light” to invade.** Kiev’s disappointment is completely understandable. Giving Moscow the green light is as much about transatlantic relations as it is about West-Russia or Ukraine-Russia relations. The US’ post-World War II hegemony is predicated on its domination in continental Europe, with **NATO acting as the principal mechanism for achieving American primacy.** The Anglo-American strategy now focuses on preventing European states from acting independently. The Russian threat is thought to serve that aim, pushing Europe to be in need of American and British power. The Anglo-American bloc has never been happy with France’s attempts to establish an alternative European security mechanism, or with Germany’s relations with Russia – especially in terms of cooperation on the Nord Stream gas pipeline. The growing economic ties between the European Union and China are also causes of concern for the Anglo-American alliance. In this context, it is not surprising Biden pointed out at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference: “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back…The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st Century, just as we did in the 20th Century.” Eliminating Russia in the ‘Great Game’? Neither NATO nor Western states will go to war with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The invasion justifies their efforts to undermine Russia economically and politically. However, the strategy of weakening Russia is not only about its military activities in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin has long embraced an approach that emphasises Russia’s great power status in a multipolar world, in direct opposition to the US’ vision of a unipolar world in which it reigns supreme. Therefore, the Anglo-American goal is not only to weaken Russia via economic sanctions, or harm Moscow’s economic interests in Europe, but also to divert its attention and energy away from the Indo and Asia-Pacific in particular, with the aim of hindering Russia’s partnerships with India and China. India has decades-long ties with Russia, and New Delhi recently started receiving Russian S-400 defence systems. But India is also a member of Quad – an alliance involving the US, Japan, and Australia, which aims to counter China’s growing assertiveness. Both the US and Britain have long been pushing India to cooperate with them in dealing with China. At the last Quad meeting, the US requested that India stand by its side in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Another important topic for discussion was the growing economic and diplomatic relationships between Russia and China. The Anglo-American bloc hopes that the Ukraine invasion will severely wound Russia, preventing it from being an important rival actor in their confrontation with China. The question of American decline Anglo-American domination will push Europe into submission to some extent, and Russia will be wounded. But will this reverse the unravelling of American hegemony in the long term? As Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear in his televised speech just before the invasion, sanctions imposed by the West will not dissuade Russia from attempting to preserve its standing on the world stage. NATO has already lost prestige and power, and the invasion of Ukraine will only worsen this situation. Increasing the Anglo-American bloc’s weight in Europe due to the conflict in Eastern Europe will also have a negative impact on their ability to contain China in Asia. As it follows Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will not cause France to abandon its call for strategic autonomy for the EU entirely, nor will it change the interdependence of Europe and Russia on gas. The Anglo-American coalition’s gas diversification efforts in favour of Europe will affect the strategic dynamics in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Yet it is not likely to obstruct the Nord Stream 2 project, despite Washington wanting to see this. Due to the steady erosion of the US’ hegemonic position in the world economy, it appears that China will continue to be the EU’s biggest trading partner. India has already signalled that it will remain neutral on the Ukraine crisis, which implies that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have little impact on the close ties between Moscow and New Delhi. More crucially, **this situation appears to have given Moscow and Beijing further reasons to act together and get closer**, despite their conflicting interests in Asia. They share a common desire to challenge the Western-dominated international system. Should Russia be wounded by Western sanctions, **it will rely on China in economic terms to some extent, while their collective security actions will hasten the demise of US hegemony.** In the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no absolute winner. Indeed, nothing will change in terms of the ongoing and gradual unravelling of global American hegemony

#### Strengthening NATO incentivized Russia to invade Ukraine. The plan overextends NATO by committing even further to it which increases tensions

Guyer 22 Jonathan Guyer (Jonathan Guyer covers foreign policy, national security, and the world for Vox. From 2019 to 2021, he worked at The American Prospect, where as managing editor he reported on Biden’s foreign-policy team.), 1-27-2022, "How America’s NATO expansion obsession plays into the Ukraine crisis," Vox, https://www.vox.com/22900113/nato-ukraine-russia-crisis-clinton-expansion

When tens of thousands of Russian troops started moving toward the Ukrainian border late last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively issued an ultimatum: They won’t go home until he had “concrete agreements prohibiting any further eastward expansion of NATO.” This week, as the US and Russia exchange formal diplomatic letters, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized that “NATO’s door is open, remains open, and that is our commitment.” But few have been asking why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would want to move east in the first place. What was once a Cold War security pact has become a 21st-century organization with global military commitments and ever more member countries from Eastern Europe. Members of the alliance didn’t always foresee its expansion and, three decades ago, some of America’s most renowned foreign policy thinkers argued that NATO should be nowhere near Ukraine. Ukraine is a former Soviet republic. It isn’t joining NATO anytime soon, and President Joe Biden has said as much. Still, NATO’s open-door policy — the alliance’s foundational principle that any qualified European country could join — cuts both ways. To the West, it’s a statement of autonomy; to Russia, it’s a threat. The core of the NATO treaty is Article 5, a commitment that an attack on any country is treated as an attack on the entire alliance — meaning any Russian military engagement with a hypothetical NATO-member Ukraine would theoretically bring Moscow into conflict with the US, the UK, France, and the 27 other NATO members. The prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO has antagonized Putin at least since President George W. Bush expressed support for the idea in 2008. “That was a real mistake,” said Steven Pifer, who from 1998 to 2000 was ambassador to Ukraine under President Bill Clinton. “It drove the Russians nuts. It created expectations in Ukraine and Georgia, which then were never met. And so that just made that whole issue of enlargement a complicated one.” No country can join the alliance without the unanimous buy-in of all 30 member countries, and many have opposed Ukraine’s membership, in part because it doesn’t meet the conditions to join. All of this has put Ukraine in an untenable position: an applicant for an alliance that wasn’t going to accept it, while irritating a potential opponent next door, without having any degree of NATO protection. Revisiting NATO’s own history is not to justify Putin’s revanchism and threats to democracy. It is certainly true that he is a repressive leader who has annexed neighbors and funded separatists, cracked down on activists and allegedly poisoned enemies. Some experts say that his criticism of NATO expansion is a mere pretext. Still, the stakes of NATO’s presence on Russia’s borders and potential expansion are high, and at least in today’s Washington, few question that presence. “The open-door policy is the one that maximizes friction with Russia, which has **culminated in the crisis we have now,**” said Mary Sarotte, a historian of international relations at Johns Hopkins University. “I don’t think Vladimir Putin is primarily interested in historical accuracy, but I believe **he is genuinely aggrieved at the way the post–Cold War order includes no stake for Russia.”** So how did it become an article of faith in Washington that NATO would expand in its membership and its purpose? Debating NATO’s future in the ’90s As the Soviet Union cracked up, it wasn’t certain that NATO would stick around either. “During the Cold War, NATO had a mission that was clear and tight, and could be put on a bumper sticker,” said Rajan Menon of the research group Defense Priorities. The alliance existed, he explained, “to deter and defeat the Warsaw pact,” the countries aligned with collapsing Soviet Russia. Its mission was in doubt after the Cold War — so much so that the president of the dissolving Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, even asked about his country joining NATO. Even the shape of the US role in Europe was uncertain. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the American public was more concerned about domestic policy. Bill Clinton had been elected with a campaign slogan of “It’s the Economy, Stupid,” and without experience as a statesman, he seemed likely to restrain America’s global ambitions. President Bill Clinton stands in front of his limo in Moscow’s Red Square, in January 1994. Diana Walker/Getty Images As Clinton became a frequent traveler to Russia and quickly plunged into statecraft, the promotion of democracy in Europe emerged as a primary US foreign policy goal. But it wasn’t clear that a military alliance like NATO would be the best way to advance that. A debate over NATO’s merits erupted in Washington in the ’90s. George Kennan, the eminent architect of the Soviet “containment” strategy and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote in 1997 that expanding NATO would be a “fateful error” because it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” Kennan was far from alone in his criticism, as journalist Peter Beinart noted this week: Thomas Friedman, America’s most prominent foreign policy columnist, declared it the “most ill-conceived project of the post-Cold War era.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan, widely considered the most erudite member of the US Senate, warned, “We have no idea what we’re getting into.” Meanwhile, military leaders saw enlargement as detrimental to US interests, the Congressional Budget Office saw it as too expensive, and, later, intelligence agencies outright opposed adding Ukraine and Georgia. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote in his memoir that he nearly resigned over enlargement. The nascent European Union might have been the channel to consolidate democratic development in post-Soviet countries. Or Europe could have been engaged through the multinational Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or even through a focus on closer relationships with individual countries. But Washington chose NATO. In the early ’90s, that generation of national security operatives weren’t prepared to forfeit leverage in Europe. “NATO had to find something to do or go out of business, and these people who grew up all their lives alongside it would not let it go out of business,” said Barry Posen, a political scientist at MIT. Jenonne Walker, who served in the Clinton White House, said she was among the minority who would have preferred the European Union as the mechanism for US engagement. “Almost everyone in the establishment wanted it to be through NATO, because that was where our influence was deemed to be greatest,” she said. Clinton first floated a program that would be a gateway to NATO membership, called the Partnership for Peace, but that was ultimately dropped. By 1994, NATO said it “would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East,” and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungry would be the first to join. Electoral politics of the moment also reinforced Clinton’s decision to back NATO expansion. Republicans had won on that platform in the ’94 midterms. Ahead of the 1996 presidential election, “the domestic side of the White House” believed that growing the alliance would “play good with Polish American, Baltic American, Hungarian American communities,” explained Pifer. President Clinton, his national security adviser Tony Lake, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were optimistic that NATO could branch out, with the possibility of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia. As that trifecta supported adding member states, the NATO alliance became an organizing principle of US foreign policy going forward. Putin’s war on Ukraine, explained NATO enlargement reoriented America in the world Initially, it took much political maneuvering for the newly united Germany to join NATO. The alliance added more eastern bloc counties in the late ’90s and early 2000s. The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the northern end of Russia’s western border joined NATO in 2005 without much fuss from Russia. As it grew, NATO became a vehicle to address new global issues that worried US leaders. “Enlarging NATO becomes the gift that keeps on giving,” said Joshua Shifrinson, an international relations scholar at Boston University. “It was a way of incentivizing liberalization in countries that had been in the Communist bloc, showing that the US still has a mission in Europe, and a way of the US projecting power and checking alternative systems like the European Union.” During the Cold War, NATO never engaged in military operations. But amid the Yugoslav conflict and Kosovo war of the ’90s, the alliance enforced a no-fly zone, then deployed a peacekeeping force, and in 1999 dropped hundreds of bombs on Yugoslavia. The whole process was delayed and disorganized, according to diplomats, and exposed NATO’s inadequacies in dealing with a hot war. That pushed Clinton to embrace NATO further. “Our inaction was making NATO look weak and irrelevant,” said Walker, who went on to serve as ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1995 to 1998. “And the line in the halls of power in Washington was, ‘We have to enlarge NATO to save it, to make it look as though it were dynamic and on the move and not stagnant.’” By taking on new military roles, the institution created new imperatives for itself. In the 2000s, NATO went to the front lines: fighting in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and training Afghan forces starting in 2003, countering piracy in waters near Somalia, and then in a military intervention that was meant to protect civilians in Libya and went much further than its United Nations–approved mandate in toppling the tyrant Muammar Qaddafi. Now, America’s foreign policy establishment is dominated by people who are even more committed to the alliance’s power than those who saved it in the 1990s. NATO’s existence and enlargement is a baseline assumption. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine aspire to join. That has consequences. James Dobbins, who served as a senior diplomat in Europe during the ’90s and 2000s, says that a commitment to NATO expansion has limited Biden’s options. “It’s particularly out of tune — the idea that the United States should expand its defense perimeter to a half-dozen countries in Europe, when we should be shifting our focus on China,” Dobbins said. At its core, this is about US power and how it has changed since the Soviet Union’s end. “It’s become a conversation about whether the US should be out in the world defending human rights and spreading democracy,” said Emma Ashford of the Atlantic Council. “Is the US out in the world to protect its own security or to be a crusading force for good?” The Biden administration will now have to find its own answer.

#### Security cooperation empirically antagonized and provoked Russia

Galen 18 Ted Galen (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011), 6-15-2018, "Is NATO Pushing Russia Towards Retaliation?," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-pushing-russia-towards-retaliation

**The United States and its NATO allies continue to find ways to antagonize Russia.** The latest provocation is a request from Norway to more than double the number of U.S. troops stationed on its territory and deploy them even closer to the border with Russia. Granted, the numbers involved are not large. There are currently 330 American military personnel in the country on a “rotational” basis. Oslo’s new request would increase the number to seven hundred. If the Norwegian government gets its way, the new troops would be stationed in the far north, barely 260 miles from Russia, in contrast to the existing unit in central Norway, several hundred miles from Russian territory. The rotational aspect theoretically complies with Norway’s pledge to Moscow in 1949 when it joined NATO that Oslo would not allow U.S. bases on its territory. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Soriede reiterated that assurance in connection with the new troop request, contending that there would be “no American bases on Norwegian soil.” Making their official status rotational supposedly means that the troops are there only on a temporary basis. It is a cynical dodge that fools no one—least of all Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in the Kremlin. Norwegian officials also insisted that the new deployment was not directed against Russia. That assurance has even less credibility than the rotational rationale. Oslo’s request came just days after nine nations along NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, the Baltic republics, and Romania called for a larger Alliance (meaning largely U.S.) **military presence in their region.** In addition to the move to increase the number of U.S. troops in Norway, **major NATO military exercises (war games)**, code‐​named Trident Juncture 18, are scheduled for October. The focus of those exercises will be central and northern Norway, and they will involve thirty‐​five thousand troops, seventy ships, and 130 aircraft. Nevertheless, Soriede insisted that she couldn’t see “any serious reason why Russia should react” to Oslo’s proposal for an enhanced U.S. military presence. She should perhaps receive credit for being able to make such a statement with a straight face. But such transparent **dishonesty is a longstanding feature of NATO’s behavior toward Moscow.** Even during the Cold War, Western officials routinely insisted that the Alliance was not directed against the Soviet Union. In their more candid moments, though, they conceded the obvious—that NATO was a military mechanism to contain Soviet power. Granted, it was not the sole purpose. Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general, stated that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The first objective, though, seemed to be the most important. Containment of the Soviet Union made sense to keep democratic Europe out of Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, and NATO was an important component of that strategy. But Western leaders continued to apply that model to a noncommunist Russia once the Cold War ended. Indeed, they intensified the containment rationale by adding new members throughout Eastern Europe and expanding the Alliance to Russia’s border. Those actions were taken despite verbal assurances from Secretary of State James Baker and West German foreign minister Hans‐​Dietrich Genscher at the time of German reunification that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s eastern border. Throughout the Alliance’s inexorable move eastward, Western officials and pundits insisted that NATO enlargement was not directed against Russia. Indeed, some members of the Western foreign‐​policy community argued that the move would benefit Russia by erasing Cold War dividing lines and increasing Eastern Europe’s political and economic stability. One wonders whether Westerners thought that the Russians were gullible enough to believe such absurd arguments, or the proponents actually believed their own propaganda. NATO leaders continue to insist that the Alliance has no offensive intent against Russia or that the Alliance seeks to undermine Moscow’s interests. **But NATO’s behavior belies such assurances**. The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that weakened and eventually truncated Serbia, a longstanding Russian ally, was certainly not a friendly act. Stationing Alliance (most notably U.S.) forces and weapons systems in NATO’s easternmost members, (a process that has accelerated markedly since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014) likewise is provocative. Yet Western leaders and publics act as through Russia has no legitimate reason to react negatively to such moves, as Soriede stated explicitly regarding the proposed increase in the U.S. troop presence in her country. NATO has conducted several large‐​scale military exercises in Poland and other member states, as well as naval maneuvers in the Black Sea near Russia’s important naval base at Sevastopol. Again, the Russians apparently are wrong to regard such actions as provocative and threatening. U.S. and NATO leaders need to adopt a much more realistic attitude. **Any nation would regard NATO’s behavior as decidedly unfriendly, and even menacing, if conducted on its frontiers.** Continuing such actions while cynically denying their hostile intent could easily lead to miscalculation and a catastrophic confrontation. As a first step toward mending ties with Moscow, the Trump administration should summarily reject Norway’s unnecessary request for more U.S. troops.

#### US/NATO security operations empirically set up proxies to fight their battles for them – Ukraine and Afghanistan proves

Miah and Sheppard 22 Malik Miah and Barry Sheppard, 3-25-2022, "US goal is to ‘bait and bleed’ Russia, not defend Ukraine’s people," Green Left, https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/us-goal-bait-and-bleed-russia-not-defend-ukraines-people-

It has become **obvious that Washington provoked Russia into the war in Ukraine** — a completely reactionary invasion that must be roundly condemned — but left Ukraine to fight it. While the Ukrainian people have the right to defend themselves by any means necessary, the government’s alliance with the United States and Western imperialist powers undermines their defense. Many inside Ukraine are for “neutrality” and against aligning solely with US world domination. The facts show that the US does not care about workers and farmers in Ukraine. It rejects an all-out direct military intervention against Russia, not because it could lead to World War III, but because its main objective is to significantly, if not completely, remove an international rival, Russia, from the world stage. In addition, the restrictions on allowing Ukrainian refugees to enter the US remains, even though President Joe Biden says Ukrainians who arrive will have temporary protective status for 18 months. It hasn’t happened yet. Dan Glazebrook documented the US “bait and bleed” policy towards Russia in a recent Counterpunch article. “The term ‘bait and bleed’,” wrote Glazebrook, “was defined by international relations theorist John Mearsheimer in 2001 as a military strategy that ‘involves causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on the sideline, its military strength intact’”. Glazebrook revealed that the current US National Defense Strategy (NDS) “explicitly endorses such a strategy”, and “makes no bones about who it is aimed at”. The NDS was authored by then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis in 2018, under former president Donald Trump’s administration and sets out “a clear road map … to meet the challenges posed by a re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with China and Russia,” wrote Glazebrook. It identifies “interstate strategic competition” rather than “terrorism” as “the primary concern in US national security” today. According to Glazebrook, “the NDS vows that ‘with our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions’. “There it is, in black and white: it is official US policy to bait Russia into conflict,” he wrote. Mearsheimer noted in a 2015 lecture that “If you really want to wreck Russia, what you really want to do is encourage Russia to conquer Ukraine”. “The US and the UK – the latter in particular – appear to have been taking this advice very seriously,” wrote Glazebrook. **US meddling in Afghanistan** Referring to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Glazebrook wrote: “Until 1998, the mainstream view of US support for the anti-communist insurgency in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s was that it had been a response to the Russian invasion of December 1979. But, as Glazebrook reminds us, “in an interview in 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, admitted that the truth was the exact opposite”. Brzezinski told Le Nouvel Observateur that Carter had signed “the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul” four months earlier. Brzezinski wrote to Carter at the time to express that “this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention”. When the Soviets officially crossed the border, he wrote to Carter, saying: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.” “Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire,” wrote Glazebrook. “Asked whether he regretted the move, which plunged Afghanistan into a conflict which is now into its fifth decade, he replied ‘Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it?’ “Plunging the Afghan people into a half-century of devastating war was of no consequence for the likes of Brzezinski. His successors clearly have the same attitude towards Ukraine,” wrote Glazebrook. It was not Russia alone that invaded Afghanistan, but the Soviet Union, which included Ukraine. Many Ukrainian troops took part in the invasion and suffered the “demoralisation” of war, as did all the Soviet Republics, including Ukraine. The occupation, and the social counter-revolution led by the decisive sector of the Soviet bureaucracy (organised by the Communist Party of the USSR) from 1998‒91, led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. This social counter-revolution overthrew the nationalised, planned economies of the Soviet Republics and restored capitalism in all of them, including Russia and Ukraine. The Brzezinski quote brings to mind one by then-US Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 1996 on 60 Minutes. Leslie Stahl asked Albright whether the sanctions taken against Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait were justified, given the reports that half a million children had died as a result. Albright answered: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price – we think the price is worth it.” Truman and Roosevelt Glazebrook referenced then-Senator Harry Truman’s comment to President Franklin D Roosevelt in 1941, concerning the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union during WWII: “If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.” In fact, the US held back on opening a “second front” against Germany and then did so only slowly, starting in northern Africa — letting both sides “bleed” in the fighting in the Soviet Union. In the end, the majority of German casualties in WWII were on the eastern front. A staggering 25 million soldiers and civilians lost their lives in the Soviet Union. The expansion of NATO east was begun under then-President Bill Clinton in 1997 and continued. **Each expansion increased tensions with Russia. The** US and Britain pressed for Ukraine and Georgia to become part of NATO, but Germany and France demurred. A compromise was reached that Ukraine and Georgia would not join immediately, but would do so in the future. This threat has been maintained to this day. Russia correctly views Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat and a “red line”. Any Russian government, including the most liberal bourgeois democracy, would do so. In 2008, acting on the promise that it would join NATO, Georgia attempted to retake two small Russian-occupied territories. This led to a short war with Russia, with Georgia believing that NATO would intervene. It did not. Glazebrook quoted Kent University Professor Richard Sakwa, a Russia and Ukraine expert, who wrote that, following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, “British Foreign Secretary David Miliband visited Kiev and pledged Britain’s support, dooming the country to becoming the next epicentre of the artificially constructed struggle for mastery of Europe.” 2014 coup The 2014 coup against the elected president of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovych, was engineered by the US. US Ambassador Victoria Nuland directly intervened to appoint the new Ukrainian nationalist government’s first president. A few US “experts” were first part of the new government. Biden’s son, Hunter, eventually joined the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian energy company, Burisma, in spite of having no experience in the field. After the coup, the new Ukrainian nationalist government in western Ukraine launched a civil war against the largely Russian-speaking east. It included downgrading the legal status of the Russian language. The civil war continued up to the present, with the NATO countries supporting the Ukrainian nationalists and Russia the other side. Glazebrook wrote that following the coup, NATO staged the Rapid Trident military exercise on Ukrainian territory on September 15‒16 of that year, a war-gaming exercise involving 15 “allied and partnered nations”. “Since then, plans for NATO incorporation have proceeded apace. A British government document listing British support to the Ukrainian military outlines these plans in detail. “In 2016, NATO outlined its Comprehensive Assistance Package of 16 ‘capacity building programmes and several trust funds for military modernization’ whilst ‘NATO allies also participate in a wide range of military exercises with Ukrainian armed forces through the Military Committee with Ukrainian Work Plan. “But it was in June 2020 that this process was really ramped up, when Ukraine was offered ‘Enhanced Opportunity Status’ with NATO. Notes the British document, ‘this status provides Ukraine with preferential access to NATO’s exercises’ and training.” No wonder the Ukrainian government believed that NATO would back it up if there was an invasion. While the US said it didn’t want a war with Russia, it coyly let the prospect of NATO intervening remain open. It wasn’t until November 2021 that NATO publicly ruled out intervention. Glazebrook’s assessment is that this was the final signal to Russia that it could invade, which Putin all along wanted to do, in keeping with his avowed intention of restoring the old Russian empire — without the tsar, but with Putin as its head. He received support from the head of the Russian Orthodox church before the invasion began. Since the invasion, Putin has bombed Ukrainian and Russian-speaking areas of the country — including the largely Russian-speaking city of Mariupol — causing many Russian speakers to join the resistance. Since the invasion, Putin has bombarded not only Ukrainian parts but also of Russian speaking parts of Ukraine, causing many Russian-speakers to join the resistance. The most egregious example has been the Russian bombardment and takeover of the largely Russian-speaking city of Mariupol. In that city and other parts that Russia has occupied, Putin has denied those people self-determination, in keeping with his tirade against the Russian Revolution and Lenin for advocating national self-determination. US will arm Ukraine up to a point The US-NATO military buildup of Ukraine has stopped Russia from a quick victory and has inflicted losses and damage to the Russian invading forces. **US policy is and will continue to be making sure that enough military aid from NATO countries is provided to Ukraine to keep the war going. But it will stop at direct intervention that would mean Russia’s defeat.** The US has built up Ukraine’s military and the civilian far-right militia — which the US has nurtured since 2014 — to assure that, if Russia succeeds in forming a weak government in Ukraine under its tutelage, there would be a massive armed resistance to continue the “bleeding”. If Russia “wins”, it loses.

#### Increasing NATO’s power supports a violent, interventionist institution and strains relations with Russia – Baltic states prove

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Hal Brands complains about critics of NATO expansion: As for the critique that it was NATO expansion that provoked Russian revisionism, this argument has always been flimsy. Yes, the expansion angered Russian officials, during Yeltsin’s time as well as Putin’s. It was undoubtedly humiliating for the fallen superpower. But the idea that NATO expansion caused Russian aggression rests on an implicit counterfactual argument that, absent NATO expansion, Russia would not have behaved in a domineering fashion toward countries on its border. There is simply nothing in Russian history — and nothing in Vladimir Putin’s personality — that supports this argument. NATO expansion has been a mistake for the U.S. because the U.S. didn’t need to add any more security commitments in Europe or anywhere else after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR meant that the threat to European peace and security had substantially diminished. There was arguably no need for NATO at all, much less a larger one. The larger alliance has not found “new purpose” through expansion, but continues to cast about looking for some reason to exist now that its only real reason for being, the Soviet Union, has been dead for almost three decades. That first took the form of “humanitarian” **intervention in Kosovo**, **an illegal war that set a precedent that Russia would subsequently exploit**, and then it morphed into supporting the unending war in Afghanistan. **In 2011, “humanitarian” intervention was once again back on the menu as the alliance was dragged into backing a U.S.-led attack on the Libyan government that destabilized the country and the surrounding region until today**. The last twenty years have seen the continued growth of the alliance at the same time that the alliance has become increasingly divorced from its original purpose of defending Europe from attack. **NATO’s expansion during that time has been a mistake, and so has NATO’s attempt to reinvent itself for a world where it is no longer needed.** There is **no question that NATO expansion has antagonized Russia and strained U.S.-Russian relations for the last two decades**. Not every round of NATO expansion has been equally provocative to Russia, but all of it has been unwelcome to them. Bringing in the Baltic states was a bad idea primarily because it overextended the alliance and because the U.S. was extending security guarantees to states that it could not actually defend. The alliance has been fortunate that it has never had to back up these commitments. The U.S. and NATO were able to “get away” with the earlier rounds because Russia was weakened enough during the 1990s that it wasn’t in a position to do anything about them. That doesn’t mean that NATO expansion up until that point was a good idea. All that it means is that it hasn’t blown up in our faces yet. It was the subsequent attempts to push for bringing Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance that proved to be truly unacceptable to Russia, and it was the 2008 Bucharest meeting when the alliance promised both states that they would eventually become members that paved the way for the conflict between Russia and Georgia later that year. NATO expansion was not the cause of the current conflict in Ukraine, but it created the context for Russia’s reaction to the overthrow of Yanukovych and the establishment of a pro-Western government in Kiev. Had there been no NATO expansion after the end of the Cold War, or even if there had been no NATO expansion after 2004, it is unlikely that the August 2008 war and the current war in Ukraine would have ever happened. Sold as something that promotes European stability and peace, continued NATO expansion has in fact undermined both in the last decade and a half.

### NATO Bad – Entanglement

#### Unless the aff is unanimously agreed upon by NATO members, states will entangle others into conflicts to reinvigorate the alliance

Recchia 22 Stefano Recchia (Stefano Recchia (PhD, Columbia University) holds the John G. Tower distinguished chair in international politics as an associate professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, TX. His research focuses on the politics and ethics of military intervention and multilateral cooperation in security affairs.), 3-31-2022, "Protecting civilians or preserving NATO? Alliance entanglement and the Bosnian safe areas," Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2044315

The possibility that the United States and some of its main allies might pull each other into conflicts besetting non-members, because of alliance pressures, has not been explicitly examined. My argument is that when alliance members at first disagree openly about how to proceed in the face of a security crisis in their neighbourhood, after a period of deadlock, concerns about the alliance’s perceived relevance and effectiveness may push the allies to coalesce around an intervention policy that none of them previously favoured. In such cases, it is appropriate to speak of mutual entanglement, given that the allies pull each other into the resulting military operation. Mutual entanglement, I argue, is especially likely for members of institutionalised alliances, such as NATO, that combine elements of both a traditional defensive alliance and a collective security organisation. Members may value the alliance not just for its mutual security guarantee, but as a symbol of their collective identity, which can be expected to generate strong incentives for consensual problem-solving.5 Imagine a situation in which core NATO members, notwithstanding pressures to tackle a security crisis in their neighbourhood, fail for a considerable time to agree on a common policy; indeed, they are at odds to such an extent that they partly undermine each other. This results in significant alliance discord and public recriminations. Eventually, pro-alliance leaders on different sides of the intra-**NATO dispute, worried about the alliance’s health, start pushing for a joint military response – motivated to a significant degree by a desire to reinvigorate the alliance and signal unity of purpose both domestically and internationally**. After some pulling and hauling, the main alliance members converge around a particular military intervention policy. The alliance – specifically, the value that member states attach to the alliance relationship – will have pulled members toward the intervention. This is not a case of one side in an alliance dragging other members into a military conflict. Instead, the allies have pulled each other toward intervention in a non-member state; they have mutually entangled each other.